Michigan Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 6

1942

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - POWER
OF ADMINISTRATOR OF WAGE AND HOURS DIVISION TO
DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO
SUBORDINATES
Jay Sorge
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay Sorge, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - POWER OF ADMINISTRATOR OF
WAGE AND HOURS DIVISION TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO
SUBORDINATES, 40 MICH. L. REV. 894 (1942).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol40/iss6/8

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT - PowER OF
ADMINISTRATOR oF WAGE AND HouRs DrvisioN TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY
TO IssuE SUBPOENA DucEs TECUM TO SUBORDINATES - The Regional
Director of the Wage and Hour Division, pursuant to authority delegated to him
by the administrator/ signed and issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering petitioner to produce its books and records which were to be used in investigating the
wages and the hours of petitioner's employees. After petitioner had failed to
comply with this subpoena, the administrator applied to the district court for
an order requiring the petitioner to appear and show cause why it should not
obey the subpoena duces tecum. This order was issued by the district court, and
petitioner appealed after the district court refused to dismiss the proceedings.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed the findings of the district court, and appeal was made to the Supreme Court. Held, the proceedings should be dis.missed since the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has no authority
under the Fair Labor Standards Act to delegate the power to issue a subpoena
duces tecum to subordinate officials. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, (U. S.
1942) 62 S. Ct. 651, affg. (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 209.
The Supreme Court recently decided, in Montgomery Ward v. Fleming
(March, 1941),2 that the Wage and Hour Division could issue subpoena duces
tecum to compel employers to produce records of the wages and the hours of
their employees without violating the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable searces and seizures." 3 Although several federal courts 4 held that
the administrator could delegate this authority to the regional and acting regional
directors, such power is denied by the Supreme Court in the principal case. 6 This
decision ignores the clear import of section 4 ( c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which provides that "The principal office of the Administrator shall be in the
1

Administrative Order No. 48, issued by the Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, published in 5 FED. REG. 1586 (April
27, 1940), authorized regional directors, acting regional directors, and territorial
representatives to issue subpoenae duces tecum in connection with investigations.
2
3u U.S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71 (1941). It is now settled that if a valid regulatory
power is being exercised and subpoenae duces tecum are necessary for investigative purposes, the "unreasonable search and seizure" clause of the Federal Constitution is no
bar to their being issued by administrative agencies. See 26 WASH. L. Q. 531 (1941).
3
U. S. Const., Art. IV.
4
Fleming v. Easton Publishing Co., (D. C. Pa. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 677; Fleming
v. Arsenal Building Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 38 F. Supp. 675; Fleming v. Lowell
Sun Co., (D. C. Mass. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 320, reversed (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) 120
F. (2d) 213, cert. granted (U.S. 1941) 62 S. Ct. 112. It was because of the conflict
between the circuit court of appeals decisions in the Lowell Sun case and in the
principal case that certiort1ri was granted. 62 S. Ct. 651 at 653. On the day following
its decision in the principal case, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, by an
equally divided court, the circuit court of appeals decision in the Lowell Sun case.
Holland v. Lowell Sun Co., (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 792.
5
Justices Douglas, Black, Byrnes and Jackson dissented from the majority opinion
in the principal case.
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District of Columbia, but he or his duly authorized representative may exercise
any or all of his powers in any place." 6 The Court reasons that since some of
the administrator's powers, by their very nature, 7 must be exercised by the administrator himself, Congress did not intend that any of his powers could be
delegated unless expressly provided in the statute. A more reasonable interpretation of section 4(c) would permit those powers which can be more efficiently
exercised by the directors of the local districts to be delegated, while denying
delegation of those powers which demand attention from the head of the
agency. Such an interpretation is more consistent with the provision of the act
enabling the administrator to appoint such local employees as may be needed to
carry out the purposes of the act, 8 for a subpoena should be issued only by officials conversant with the details of the matter under investigation rather than
by the administrator, who may be distant from the scene of investigation and
only vaguely familiar with its details.9 The interpretation given the statute in
Fleming v. Easton Publishing Company 10 precludes an abusive use of the sub-

52 Stat. L. 1060, § 4(c) (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 204(c).
The Court mentions the powers given to the administrator to appoint industry
committees and the chairmen thereof, to approve or disapprove their reports, to provide for employment of learners and handicapped workers, as examples of those powers
which could not be delegated to subordinates.
8
52 Stat. L. 1060, § 4(b) (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 204(b).
9
S. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 1, p. 33, note 61 (Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Monograph on the Administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
The committee concludes that if subpoenae duces tecum can only be issued by the
administrator, the act should be amended because of the cumbersome procedure involved if the burden of issuing these subpoenae is placed on the administrator, who is
unfamiliar with the details of the investigation. In Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9 at 19, Circuit Judge Major said
concerning the National Labor Relations Act: "Under the procedure followed, petitioner
was required to make application for subpoenas, not to the Examiner or a Regional
Director, but to the Board or a member thereof in Washington, specifying the 'name
of the witness and the nature of the facts to be proved by him.' How the Board in
Washington, or a member thereof, could be in a position to determine the materiality
of 'the nature of the facts to be proved,' especially where the issues were as numerous
and complicated as they were in the instant case, it is difficult to understand." According to the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, supra, this procedure has proved so cumbersome in the Labor Board proceedings that the board signs
subpoenae in blank to be issued by the trial examiners during the trial in accordance with
general instructions given by the board, but the defendant has no such convenient source
at his disposal.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in the principal case, 62 S. Ct. at 657,
says: "The Administrator in Washington can hardly exercise an independent judgment
as to what the range or course of a particular investigation should be in remote Alaska
or Puerto Rico. At least he cannot do so unless the processes of law enforcement are to
come to a standstill."
10
(D. C. Pa. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 677. The court said that it was clear, in view of
the multiple duties imposed on the administrator, that the legislature intended the power
to issue subpoenae duces tecum could be delegated, but since the power must be closely
guarded, Congress did not intend that the power could be delegated to an attorney
6

7
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poena duces tecum, since the court there held that only a reasonable delegation
of authority was intended and that the right to issue subpoenae duces tecum could
only be delegated to the regional directors and acting regional directors who are
directly responsible to the administrator. Furthermore, the history of the bill in
Congress indicates that this power was intended to be delegated since the original
Senate bill provided for delegation of the power to issue subpoenae duces tecum
and the .final bill as approved by the Joint Committee of both Houses contained
section 4(c), which none of the original drafts had included.11 Since section
12
I I (a)
provides that the administrator or his duly authorized representative
can make investigations necessary for the purposes of the act, the Court in the
principal case decided that section 4 ( c) was not intended to authorize delegation
of authority by the administrator because the words "or his duly authorized
representative" would then be surplusage. A better interpretation would be that,
since the investigatory power is the type of power that should be delegated, the
inclusion of these words is merely reiterating the policy expressed in section 4 ( c)
of allowing delegation of those powers that can be best exercised by the local
representative of the division. The Court's interpretation would lead to the untoward result of the administrator having to perform all the other powers given
him by the act, since only section I I (a) mentions that the duly authorized
representatives as well as the administrator may exercise the powers granted.13
In view of the multiple duties of the administrator, such a result shows the fallacy
of the local office but only to the regional director or acting regional director both of
whom are directly under the control of the administrator.
11
See H. REP. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937); H. REP. 2182, 75th Cong.,
3d sess. (1938); S. REP. 884, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937). The bill proposed by the
House of Representatives did not contain any provision for the power to delegate
authority to issue subpoenae duces tecum, but this proposed plan was structurally different in that the Secretary of Labor occupied the position held by the administrator in
the act as adopted.
12
52 Stat. L. 1060, § II(a) (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 2II(a):
"The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data
regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in any
industry subject to this Act. • . ." Since this section does not expressly say that the
powers of investigation may be delegated, the argument of the Court in the principal
case that since this section expressly provides for delegation of this power, Congress only
intended powers to be delegated if the act expressly provided for this loses much of its
force. A more logical interpretation of this section would be that the inclusion of the
words "or his representative" was merely expressing what was already implicit in the act
in section 4(c).
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in the principal case, 62 S. Ct. at 658,
said: "Hence, in view of the nature of the Administrator's functions and the fact that
the power to make investigations can be delegated, the lesser but companion power to
delegate the issue of subpoenas should be implied as an incident of the office."
13
See 52 Stat. L. 1060, §§ 4-14 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 204214, for the multiple duties imposed on the administrator by the act. The only provision which says that the "Administrator or his authorized representative" may perform these duties is § 204 (c), so that if the Court's view in the principal case is accepted, all other duties of the administrator would have to be performed in person by
him.
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of the Court's interpretation of the statute.1' Several other governmental agencies
have been permitted to delegate the power to issue subpoenae duces tecum,15 even
though in some instances, such as the Federal Power Commission Act, it is arguable that the statute does not authorize such delegation.16 It would seem, therefore, that viewed purely as a matter of statutory interpretation the decision of
the Supreme Court in the principal case is erroneous.
lay Sorge

14 In the opinion of the district court in the Lowell Sun case, Judge Ford said:
"Congress evidently did not intend that the Administrator would perform all the
duties that were required by the Act, and the language of Section 4 (c) gives ample
authority to permit the Administrator to delegate to an Acting Regional Director
authority to sign such a subpoena as we are concerned with here, in order to obviate
delay and expense and to lighten, in part, the burden imposed upon the Administrator
in the performance of his multiple duties under the Act." Fleming v. Lowell Sun Co.,
(D. C. Mass. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 320 at 326.
15 The circuit court of appeals in the Lowell Sun case, (C. C. A. ISt, 1941) 120 F.
(2d) 213 at 216, note 2, mentions that the commission or administrator in the Federal Trade Commission, Civil Service Commission, Board of Tax Appeals, and National Labor Relations Board are not authorized to delegate the power to issue subpoenae duces tecum while this power may be delegated in the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Federal Power Commission, Tariff Commission, United States Maritime
Commission, and Federal Communications Commission. It is interesting to note that
both in the Tariff Commission Act, 46 Stat. L. 699 (1930), 19 U. S. C. (1934), §
1333, which the Court in the principal case says permits delegation, and in the
Federal Trade Act, 38 Stat. L. 722 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 49, which does
not permit delegation, the granting clauses are exactly the same: "Any member of the
commission may sign subpoenas, and members and agents of the commission, when
authorized by the commission, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses,
take testimony, and receive evidence."
16 Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. L. 856 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §
825f (b): "For the purpose of any investigation or any other proceeding under this
Act, any member of the Commission, or any officer designated by it, is empowered to
administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take
evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, contracts, agreements or other records which the Commission finds relevant
or material to the inquiry." Since the commission must find that the records to be
subpoenaed are material and relevant, the courts might interpret this to mean that only
the commission could issue subpoenae duces tecum. Since the Court in the principal
case, 62 S. Ct. at 656, note I I, states that the Federal Power Commission has the
power to delegate the authority to issue subpoenae duces tecum, it would seem that the
Court would also interpret liberally the Fair Labor Standards Act so as to give the
administrator this power. On the interpretation of the Federal Power Act, see S. Doc.
10, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 12, p. 35 (Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Monograph on the Federal Power Commission).

